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SCENARIO RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE 
  2019 Baseline 2020 Severe 2020 Benign 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)         
Private Consumer Expenditure 3 -13 -20 -12 
Public Net Current Expenditure 6 11 15 11 
Investment 94 -28 -39 -18 
Exports 11 -8 -10 -7 
Imports 36 -12 -13 -10 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 6 -12 -17 -9 
Gross National Product (GNP) 3 -14 -19 -10 
  
    
Labour Market 
    
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000))  2,322   2,026   1,976   2,081  
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 121 427 477 371 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 5 17 19 15 
          
Public Finances         
General Government Balance (€bn) 1 -28     
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The Irish Economy – Overview 
 
As with most countries the Irish economy is now in the midst of a substantial 
downturn prompted both by COVID-19 itself and the necessary actions of the 
public authorities in the form of the administrative closures initiated in March 
2020. On 1 May the Government published a roadmap for easing these restrictions 
over the coming months.  
 
In this Commentary, we continue the practice of the previous approach taken to 
assess the impact of COVID-19 on the Irish economy. Namely, we adopt a scenario 
approach as opposed to a traditional forecast. We present three different scenario 
outcomes which take into consideration the Government Roadmap for reopening 
the economy and varying epidemiological developments for the rest of the year. 
These are: 
a)  a new normal ‘Baseline’ scenario which assumes continued physical 
distancing and containment measures to the end of 2020;  
b) a second wave ‘Severe’ scenario in which the country is put into strict 
lockdown again in Q4; and  
c) a pandemic suppression ‘Benign’ scenario which allows economic and social 
life to return to normal in Q4.  
 
Overall, the results of our Baseline scenario indicate that the impact of COVID-19 
on the Irish economy is likely to be much more extreme than was initially thought 
in the previous Commentary. Under this scenario, economic output would decline 
by 12.4 per cent in 2020. Consumption declines by 13.3 per cent while investment 
falls by over 27 per cent this year. The effect is also more significant for the traded 
sector with Irish exports of goods and services set to fall by over 8 per cent in this 
scenario. 
 
Unemployment is now set to average 17.4 per cent for 2020 under this scenario 
with the fiscal accounts now facing a deficit of at least 9 per cent of GDP or 
€27.5 billion. 
 
The Severe scenario which assumes that a second wave of the virus prompts 
another lockdown in the Autumn of 2020 would see economic output contract by 
17 per cent for the present year. 
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The Commentary includes a number of Boxes which assess the implications of the 
pandemic on domestic public finances, bond yields, exports, the labour market, 
household income and savings.  
 
The Commentary also contains a previously published Special Article which 
examines the most up-to-date data available on Emergency Department (ED) 
attendances in Irish public hospitals to observe if the number of attendances has 
changed since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article also examines if 
changes in ED attendances have occurred at similar rates across age groups, 
regions, and urgency of attendance since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
Given the continued uncertainty concerning COVID-19 and the impact of the 
associated measures taken to contain the spread of the virus, we maintain the 
approach adopted in the previous Commentary of using scenario analysis to 
examine the likely future path of the Irish economy. In the present Commentary 
we conduct three different scenarios. These are as follows: 
1. The new normal or Baseline scenario: This scenario follows the current 
timelines for the Government Roadmap. This assumes that the 
epidemiological phase of the crisis follows the current predictions with a 
social distancing recovery period following from 10 August. This recovery 
period persists throughout the remainder of Q3 and Q4 of 2020. 
2. The second wave or Severe scenario: Following the implementation of the 
measures in the Government’s roadmap, a second viral wave emerges in 
September 2020. This is assumed to result in a re-introduction of the strict 
lockdown measures. In this scenario, normal economic activity is assumed 
not to resume until early 2021. 1 
3. The pandemic suppression or Benign scenario: In this case, disease 
suppression is so effective that a full return to normal economic activity 
occurs within the final quarter of 2020. This scenario is in line with the 
scenario adopted in the previous Commentary. 
 
Pre-COVID, normal circumstances only resume under the Benign scenario in 2020. 
Under both the Baseline and the Severe scenarios, there is no return to normal, 
pre-COVID conditions, in 2020. Both scenarios enter what we call a recovery period 
post-August 2020. In this case the easing of conditions follows the timelines in the 
Government Roadmap. However, under the baseline scenario we assume that 
social distancing is still being practised on a widescale basis with economic 
consequences for certain sectors of the economy. The outbreak of a second wave 
of the virus in the Severe scenario case prompts another lockdown to occur in Q4.  
 
For the three scenarios we generate the implications for aggregate consumption, 
investment, imports and exports. However, we only present results for the public 




1  It may not require a second wave of the virus for a more severe scenario to occur. For example, a significant loss in 
consumer and business confidence, disruptions to supply chains, delayed recoveries for Ireland’s trading partners, 
teething problems for firms in getting used to the new normal could all result in a more severe scenario than the 
baseline case. 
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with expenditure and revenue receipts over the year. We tailor the scenarios for 
each component of the economy (consumption, investment and exports). 
 
Under the Baseline scenario, consumption now falls by over 13 per cent in 2020 
with investment contracting by almost 28 per cent. Based on the results for 
consumption, imports decline by 12 per cent while the international downturn 
results in the external demand for Irish goods and services falling by over 8 per 
cent. Overall, this results in economic activity in the Irish economy being down by 
12.4 per cent in 2020 compared with 2019.  
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Where are we now? 
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a major shock to economic and social life 
which is unprecedented in modern times. Household expenditure is expected to 
fall dramatically in 2020 due to a combination of factors. These include regulatory 
restrictions on retail and shopping activities which prevent expenditure; 
adjustments to household incomes due to labour market shocks; uncertainly 
related effects which change precautionary savings and other behavioural 
responses. All of these factors are likely to lower household spending to well below 
pre-pandemic levels.  
 
In terms of early quantifications of the magnitude of adjustment, emerging 
international evidence2 and recent Irish statistics point to a sizable decline in 
household expenditure following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent 
real-time data published by the CSO on retail sales shows dramatic falls in certain 
spending categories and moderate rises in others in March 2020. Figure 1 presents 
the change in retail sales by category as a percentage of the average 
January/February figures (volumes, seasonally adjusted). While overall retail sales 
expenditure is down 13 per cent in March relative to January/February, 
expenditure in bars and on clothing and footwear is down over 50 per cent. 
Expenditure on motor trade items and in department stores is down well over 




2  Chen et al. (2020) explore changes in household spending in China; Baker et al. (2020) consider developments for the 
US and Cook et al. (2020) do a similar assessment for England and Wales. All studies show a considerable decline in 
spending but major heterogeneity depending on the expenditure type.   
Baker, S., R. Farrokhnia, S. Meyer, M. Pagel and C. Yannelis (2020). ‘How does household spending respond to an 
epidemic? Consumption during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic’, NBER Working Papers 26949, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
Chen, H., W. Qian and Q. Wen (2020). ‘The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on consumption: Learning from high 
frequency transaction data’, SSRN (6 April), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568574. 
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However, expenditure on food and beverages is up by between 13 and 16 per cent 
for specialised and non-specialised stores. To contextualise these numbers, it must 
be noted that the widescale restrictions on economic and social life were only 
introduced in Ireland on 28 March. Limited, targeted restrictions such as closing 
schools and pubs had been introduced earlier in the month but the severe 
lockdown was not in place. This suggests that most of the adjustments across the 
non-pub items in the data available at this point may reflect behavioural change by 
households in light of the epidemic.  
 
FIGURE 1  CHANGE IN RETAIL SALES: MARCH AS A PERCENTAGE OF JANUARY/FEBRUARY AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Retail Sales Volumes Data, Seasonally Adjusted.  
 
Recent credit and debit card data have been published by the Central Bank of 
Ireland for March giving an insight into actual household behaviour. These data are 
highly informative as they contain information on services expenditure that is not 
captured in the retail sales data. Figure 2 clearly indicates a dramatic fall in 
expenditure on transport, accommodation, education and restaurants, all well in 
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February.3 Overall, service expenditure is down 30 per cent over this period. While 
no detailed data are available, the aggregate statistics from the April credit and 
debit card data suggest a further decline of approximately 30 per cent in the value 
of transactions relative to the March figures.  
 
FIGURE 2  CHANGE IN NEW SPENDING ON CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS: MARCH AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF JANUARY/FEBRUARY AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit and Debit Card Statistics, Table A.13.  
 
A final, real-time leading indicator for consumption expenditure is consumer 
sentiment. This indicator has also shown a dramatic decline in recent weeks as the 
pandemic restrictions have become stricter, uncertainty has increased regarding 
the economic outlook, and labour market conditions have deteriorated 
significantly. Figure 3 presents recent trends in consumer sentiment for Ireland and 
selected other European countries drawing on the European Commission 
consumer sentiment data. It can be seen that for all countries presented (with the 
exception of Denmark) the consumer sentiment figures since the onset of the 
pandemic point to a dramatic decline that is more rapid than any single fluctuation 
seen since the series began in 2006. This period of course covers that of the 
financial crisis (panel B).  
Taken together, these indicators provide clear evidence of a major fall in household 




3  Please note differences between the CSO and CBI data can arise due to several reasons. This includes differences in 
the reporting population (such as online captured in the CBI data), differences in value and volumes as well as cash 
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FIGURE 3 RECENT TRENDS IN CONSUMER SENTIMENT 
Recent Trends in Consumer Sentiment 
 
 
Looking Back to the Financial Crisis 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Looking forward: some scenarios for household consumption  
To attempt to develop alternative pathways for household consumption for 2020, 
we present three scenarios in line with our general approach in this Commentary: 
a ‘new normal’ Baseline, a ‘second wave’ Severe case and a ‘pandemic suppression’ 
Benign scenario. All of these scenarios assume that the Government Roadmap for 
reopening the economy continues until August/September. The scenarios differ in 
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To estimate an annual growth rate for 2020 under each of the scenarios, we use 
the estimated change in consumption under each scenario presented by Coffey et 
al. (2020).4 They use microdata from the Household Budget Survey 2015/2016 and 
estimate how spending may develop across the same scenarios as presented in the 
QEC. They map changes across the year using a combination of existing data, 
international literature and judgement. The difference in consumption relative to 
2019 from their study across the scenarios is presented in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1  COUNTERFACTUAL CONSUMPTION FIGURES BY SCENARIO (% CHANGE FROM 2019) 
 Baseline Severe Benign 
Food  -1 -4 -2 
Drink and Tobacco  -18 -22 -14 
Clothing and Footwear  -25 -41 -25 
Housing -2 -4 -2 
Fuel and Light 0 0 0 
Non-Durables  5 7 4 
Durables  -16 -38 -16 
Transport  -34 -48 -30 
Miscellaneous -16 -22 -14 
Total  -13 -20 -12 
Total (excluding housing and light) -17 -25 -15 
 
Source:  Coffey et al., 2020  
 
Under these scenarios, we therefore expect consumption to be between 12 and 
20 per cent lower than the previous year. While the extent of the fall in 
consumption will be considerable this year, the extensive income supports that 
have been introduced for households to cushion the economic blow will in fact 
allow an increase in savings for many households. These dynamics are discussed in 
more detail in Box 1. In a sense, the increase in the savings rate may provide a 
considerable stimulus once restrictions are lifted and normal economic life 
continues. This may ensure that some of the consumption shock is temporary 
rather than permanent in nature. However, this dynamic is dependent on the 
extent to which the State can continue to support income levels through the rest 





4   Coffey, C., K. Doorley, C. O’Toole and B. Roantree (2020). ‘The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on consumption and 
indirect tax in Ireland’, ESRI Budget Perspectives 2021 Paper 3. 
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BOX 1 THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PERSONAL SAVINGS 
As discussed in Beirne et al., 2020, one of the features of this crisis is the exceptional level 
of support by the government sector for household finances in Ireland. As the research 
shows, quite a number of those affected are actually better off under the schemes, and 
for many of the other beneficiaries the state support replaces much of their after-tax 
income. As a result, the schemes are very expensive for the State. 
TABLE A PERSONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS, € BILLION 
2019 2020 % 
Market Income 110.9 92.6 -16.5
Other Income 23.8 23.9 0.4 
Taxes -45.6 -37.2 -18.5
Welfare Payments 27.0 32.2 19.0 
Disposable income 116.1 111.5 -3.9
Adjustments 1.8 1.7 -5.6
Consumption 105.5 92.4 -12.4
Personal savings 12.2 22.0 79.7 
Savings Rate 10.5 19.7 
Source:  CSO and QEC forecasts. 
The result of the state support for aggregate personal income is shown in Table A. While 
market income is expected to be down by almost 17 per cent this year, disposable income 
will only fall by 4 per cent. The difference arises from the reduction in taxes on income of 
19 per cent, together with the 19 per cent increase in the value of welfare payments. With 
consumption expected to fall by over 12 per cent, this means that households will 
substantially increase their savings – by around €10 billion – taking the savings rate to 
20 per cent. This increase in savings represents 6 per cent of adjusted Gross National 
Income (GNI*). 
Across much of the OECD area a similar pattern is developing. While there is a dramatic 
loss in market income in all countries, state support for households is expected to replace 
much of this loss in 2020. Exceptional falls in consumption mean that household savings 
will show a major increase. 
Table B shows the latest forecasts for a range of European countries.5 For all countries 
shown in the Table there is a big rise in private sector savings. With the exception of Ireland 
and the UK, the rise in private sector savings is between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of the 
reduction in government savings (government current revenue minus current 
expenditure). For the UK the forecast rise in private sector savings actually exceeds the 
reduction in government savings. In Ireland, private savings are forecast to account for just 
over half of government dissaving. 
These forecasts suggest that governments across Europe are insulating households from 
the immediate effects of the crisis but, instead of spending these transfers on consumption 
5 The Figures for Ireland are from this QEC. The figures for the UK are from the NIESR Quarterly published on 1 May and 
the figures for the other countries are from the latest EU Commission forecasts available in the EU Commission AMECO 
database. 
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or investment, at an aggregate level the combined household and company sectors are 
saving.6 When the likely fall in investment is taken into account, there is forecast to be 
little change in the current account of the Balance of Payments in individual countries, with 
government borrowing being largely counterbalanced by private savings. 
 
TABLE B    PERSONAL INCOME AND SAVINGS IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, % OF GDP/GNI* 
 Euro 
Zone Germany France Spain Italy 
Netherla
nds UK Ireland 
Source: EU EU EU EU EU EU NIESR QEC 
Households 4.8 4.6 5.5 4.6 4.8 3.4 8.7 5 
Company 1 2.5 -1 0.7 2 1.5 1 3.4 
Government -7.3 -8 -6.5 -7 -8.1 -7.1 -7.1 -15.3 
Gross national savings -1.5 -1 -2 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 2.6 -6.9 
Balance of Payments 0 -1.5 0 1.2 0.4 -1.2 3.2  
Total Savings -1.5 0.6 -1.9 -2.8 -1.7 -0.9 -0.6   
Investment -1.5 0.1 -1.5 -2.9 -1 -0.9 0  
 
Sources:  EU, NIESR and QEC. 
Note:  Appropriate data for the Balance of Payments and investment are not available for Ireland. 
 
In contrast to the financial crisis of 2008-2012, at the end of 2020 the household sector in 
Ireland, and elsewhere in Europe, is likely to have a stronger balance sheet than at the 
beginning of the year. This raises a question as to how households will react in 2021 and 
2022 to this change.  
There is a wide literature on household behaviour, with a range of different models 
explaining how much of household income is devoted to consumption in a particular year 
and how households choose the range of goods and services they buy with their income. 
It is widely recognised that consumers take into account both current income and 
expectations of future income when choosing their current consumption. Consumers are 
also affected by uncertainty about their future income, so that they may save to prepare 
for future shocks. Thus, it is no surprise that consumers today are engaging in 
precautionary saving in case of permanent job loss. In this crisis consumers are also unable 
to buy certain goods and services, such as foreign travel and the services of pubs or 
restaurants. Finally, consumers with financial assets may also be facing losses in the value 
of those assets, which may lead them to increase their savings today. Understanding which 
of these factors is causing the rise in saving in the current crisis is important.  
Because of the magnitude of the exceptional savings this year, the future disposition of 
this household saving could have a significant impact on the nature of the economic 
recovery. For example, if the additional savings made by Irish households in 2020 were all 
spent in 2021 on goods and services, instead of consumption rising by almost 10 per cent 




6  Obviously, there is a huge amount of heterogeneity across households and companies within individual countries. 
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Continuing uncertainty in 2021 could postpone such a consumer boom to 2022. 
Households, having been prevented from taking a holiday abroad in 2020, may choose to 
spend a significant part of the savings on holidaying in 2021 or 2022. 
Thus, the position of consumers this year is most unusual: households have income that 
they cannot spend because of restrictions on movement. They are, in a sense, rationed in 
their spending on these goods and services. While households could spend their income 
on the unrestricted goods and services, they are clearly not doing so, but saving instead. 
The last time consumers in Ireland found themselves in this position was during the Second 
World War. During the war years fuel and goods, other than food and drink, were 
unavailable because of an inability to import. Real incomes, especially of farmers, rose and 
consumers dramatically increased their savings. While the increased savings were clearly 
partly driven by uncertainty about the future, they were also a reflection of the limitation 
on the range of goods available. 
FIGURE A CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS AT CONSTANT PRICES, £ MILLION 
 
 
Source:  CSO, Tables of National Income and Expenditure, 1938 and 1944-1949. 
 
Figure A shows how consumer behaviour changed during the war years and its aftermath. 
By 1944, consumption of ‘other goods’ was more than halved from the pre-war level of 
consumption in 1938. As shown in the Figure, instead of spending their income on food 
and services, which were available, they saved it. Through the war years the government 
sector balanced its budget and investment was also extremely low. The result was a large 
surplus on the current account of the Balance of Payments. When the war ended and the 
full range of goods became available, there was a boom in consumption of these goods, 
especially in 1947 and 1948. Instead of continuing to save, many households used their 
savings, built up over the war years, to buy previously unavailable items. As a result, the 
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If household behaviour today were similar to that of the 1940s, the ‘forced’ saving by 
households could result in a consumer boom if and when the crisis is perceived as being 
fully over, possibly in 2022. This delayed stimulus, funded by government transfers to the 
household sector in 2020, could aid the recovery.  
As the same story is being played out across the EU today, if EU households followed a 
similar pattern to those in Ireland, it could contribute to a more vigorous recovery than 
might otherwise be anticipated. However, even such an outcome would go nowhere near 
compensating for the huge loss of output in 2020 across the EU.  
Finally, it is striking that much of the large borrowing in 2020 by European governments is 
balanced by savings by the private sector in each country – there is little change in the net 
foreign indebtedness of individual countries. This makes the borrowing much more 
sustainable than in the financial crisis of 2008-2012 when governments, such as that of 
Ireland, had to finance their deficits by borrowing abroad. Also, the potential stimulus in 
2021 or 2022 from the spending of private savings could reduce the need for further fiscal 
action to stimulate the recovery. 
 
References: 
Beirne K., K. Doorley, M. Regan, B. Roantree and D. Tuda (2020). ‘The potential costs and 
distributional effect of COVID-19 related unemployment in Ireland’. Budget Perspectives 
2021, Paper 1, April. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
This Box was prepared by John FitzGerald. 
 
TRADED SECTOR 
Developments in exports 
As authorities throughout the world put in place procedures to combat the spread 
of COVID-19, real-time data show a major economic decline that is unprecedented 
in speed and scale outside wartime. Many of Ireland’s major trading partners have 
already experienced significant declines in output so far this year as restrictions on 
economic and social life have been introduced. In the EU, GDP declined by 3.5 per 
cent in Q1 relative to the previous quarter. This was reflected in the major 
economies of the Single Market where growth declined by 5.8, 5.2, 4.7 and 2.2 per 
cent in France, Spain, Italy and Germany respectively. In the UK, GDP growth for 
the quarter fell by 2.0 per cent compared to the previous quarter. While in the US, 
the country which has the largest confirmed number of deaths related to 
COVID-19, GDP fell by 4.8 per cent in Q1. Given that the lockdown measures across 
most of these countries were only implemented towards the end of Q1 and have 
now been in place for a sustained period of time through Q2, it is likely that the 
economic situation will be even more adverse in the second quarter. 
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These developments are likely to have a profound negative impact on the Irish 
traded sector and by extension the overall economy. In order to estimate the 
magnitude of this impact we draw heavily on analysis using the ESRI’s 
macroeconomic model COSMO. In Box 2, Bergin and Rodriguez forecast the extent 
to which Irish exports will be impacted by the global crisis. Using estimates of world 
demand from the NiGEM model, they forecast Irish exports for 2020 under three 
scenarios. They determine that the shock to Irish exports will range between 
4.7 and 9.6 per cent depending on the severity of the downturn for the 
international economy. We adjust these forecasts slightly for our own forecasts in 
order to take into account the differences in the timeline of our scenarios and 
those in the COSMO analysis. Consequently, we forecast exports to decline by 6.7, 
8.2 and 9.7 per cent in the Benign, Baseline and Severe scenarios respectively. 
 
BOX 2  EXPORT SCENARIOS FOLLOWING THE CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK 
As a small open economy, Ireland is very sensitive to the global economy and therefore to 
changes in trade and financial flows. Internationally, measures have been put in place that 
have essentially paused much normal economic activity and global output has fallen 
dramatically. The duration of the disruption is highly uncertain, and many countries are 
grappling with how to phase a return to more normal levels of economic activity in a way 
that prevents the virus from spreading. Many international assessments indicate that, if 
disease suppression is successful in the first half of 2020, there will be a rebound in the 
international economy in the second half of 2020 (see, for example, IMF, 2020; NIESR, 
2020; Battistini, 2020) as the public health measures necessary to contain the spread of 
the COVID-19 virus are gradually relaxed. However, the extent and pace of any recovery in 
the international economy is highly uncertain. Broadly, most analysis rests on the 
assumptions that countries experiencing lockdowns will see them eased after around 
three months, with a gradual return to pre-lockdown levels of activity, that the pandemic 
wanes in the second half of the year and that there isn’t a second wave of the virus when 
the lockdowns end. 
As such, there is heightened uncertainty for the future path for Irish exports. In this Box, 
we explore a range of potential scenarios for the global economy and how this might 
impact the demand for Irish exports. Our broad approach is to generate alternative paths 
for the international economy drawing on, for example, recent scenario analysis using 
NiGEM, a global multi-country model with explicit trade linkages across countries, to 
assesses the possible international economic impact of the coronavirus outbreak. We then 
incorporate these international impacts into COSMO, the ESRI’s model of the Irish 
economy. We compare the results to a ‘no-pandemic’ baseline scenario to gauge the 
impact on the changed international environment on Ireland. In addition to a Moderate 
Scenario, we also consider a Benign scenario where factors such as Ireland’s sectoral 
export composition helps mitigate some of the international shock and a Severe scenario 
where issues such as long-lasting disruptions to supply chains results in an amplification of 
the international shock. 
Moderate Scenario 
Our moderate scenario draws on recent global scenario analysis from NIESR (Hurst et al., 
2020). They focus on the main channels through which the virus is impacting the global 
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economy, specifically reduced spending, an increase in business uncertainty, a reduction 
in hours of work due to illness, and a temporary lockdown of economies in the countries 
affected by the outbreak. They assume that internationally the crisis will peak in Q2 of 
2020 and that the most severe economic impacts will be in the first three quarters of the 
year. The most important consequence of this scenario for Ireland is a reduction in the 
world demand for Irish exports of just under 20 per cent in the first two quarters of the 
year before global demand rebounds. 
Benign Scenario 
Research has shown that the export orientation of the economy and, in particular, the 
sectoral structure of Irish exports helped to alleviate the worst impacts of the financial 
crisis and was an important determinant in the subsequent recovery (see, for example, 
McQuinn and Varthalitis, 2018; Barry and Bergin, 2020). The most recent data available for 
the period of the COVID-19 restrictions suggest that the export sector of the economy has 
held up well in recent months. Figure B shows the contributions of various subsectors to 
manufacturing export growth. Over time, the contributions of pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices have generally been positive (although pharmaceuticals impacted 
negatively on export growth in 2012 and 2013 due to the expiry of a number of patents); 
in the first quarter of 2020 overall manufacturing export growth has been robust and 
pharmaceuticals contributed significantly to that growth.  
 
FIGURE B SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRISH MANUFACTURING EXPORT GROWTH 
(PERCENTAGE POINTS) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
To incorporate the fact that the composition of Irish exports may result in exports suffering 
more limited negative effects than is the case in many other countries, we modify the 
shock to global demand for Irish exports from what was considered in the Moderate 
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reduction in demand is halved in Q2 2020, and by Q3 it is back at their pre-crisis ‘no-
pandemic’ projection. This alternative trajectory in the Benign scenario implies a reduction 
in world demand in 2020 of 6.1 per cent relative to a no-pandemic situation, compared to 
a 9.5 per cent reduction in the Moderate scenario. 
Severe Scenario 
It is also possible that, as a consequence of the global pandemic, supply chains could 
experience longer lasting disruptions, firms may decide to alter their supply chains, the 
economic effects may be more severe in some countries and they may recover at different 
speeds, globalisation may slow, and countries may decide to become more self-reliant in 
the production of certain goods and products. These types of factors, if they materialise, 
would have serious implications for the Irish export sector. To take account of this 
downside risk, we follow the alternative scenarios developed in ECB (2020). Their most 
negative scenario assumes a longer term strict lockdown with only limited success in 
containing the spread of the virus, thus dampening activity around the world for a longer 
period and leading to permanent losses. Applying this trajectory for external demand to 
Ireland implies an (annual) reduction in the world demand for Irish exports for 2020 of 
16.6 per cent. 
Results 
In COSMO, changes to the demand for Irish exports affects the economy first through the 
traded sector. In comparison to a ‘no-pandemic’ Baseline, sectoral production in the 
Benign, Moderate and Severe scenarios is 4.2 per cent, 6.0 per cent and 8.7 per cent lower, 
respectively, for the year 2020; with exports down by 4.7 per cent, 6.7 per cent and 9.6 per 
cent, respectively, compared to the ‘no-pandemic’ Baseline scenario.  
Conclusions 
This Box presents model based scenarios describing how different paths for the 
international economy, arising from the effects of COVID-19, may impact the Irish 
economy. The future path of the Irish recovery depends on many different factors whose 
likelihood, importance and economic impact are themselves uncertain. This Box considers 
the importance of external factors. Other elements that will determine the future 
trajectory of the economy include: the duration of measures to contain the spread of the 
virus and whether they may have to be re-introduced at a later stage; the resilience of the 
productive structure to sustain a period of closure and/or disruptions to their supply 
chains; and the behavioural response of consumers and investors once activity resumes.  
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This Box was prepared by Adele Bergin and Abian Garcia Rodriguez. 
 
Developments in imports 
While the magnitude of the decline in exports will largely be determined by 
developments abroad, the size of the shock to imports is more likely to be related 
to domestic factors. As disposable income in the economy decreases, individuals 
will also decrease their levels of consumption. In an open economy like Ireland, 
where individuals buy goods and services from abroad, any decrease in 
consumption will inevitably lead to a fall in imports. Again, utilising the COSMO 
model, we find that a negative 1 per cent shock to consumption in a given year 
reduces imports in that year by 0.6 per cent. Imports are also correlated to business 
activity, with investment by domestic firms tied to imports of goods and services 
from abroad. As investment declines over the course of the year we also expect 
there to be a fall in imports related to inflows of capital goods. In addition to the 
traditional demand-side factors, imports will also be impacted by disruptions to 
the global supply chains caused by the pandemic. These disruptions will reduce the 
production capacity of foreign firms leading to a fall in the availability of goods and 
services for imports into Ireland. However, some import sectors are more likely to 
be impacted than others, with imports of cyclical goods such as Machinery and 
Equipment and consumer durables likely to be significantly impacted by the 
deteriorating economic situation. In the Baseline scenario imports are forecast to 
decline by 12.0 per cent in 2020. Under the Severe scenario, as consumption and 
investment deteriorate further, imports decrease by 13.2 per cent. Finally, in the 
Benign scenario imports decrease by 9.9 per cent for the year. 
 
INVESTMENT 
As with the other components of economic output, the magnitude of the decline 
in investment in 2020 will largely be dependent on the trajectory of COVID-19 and 
the policy response over the rest of the year. Underlying investment is particularly 
sensitive to changes in both the domestic and international economy, and 
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regardless of which of the three scenarios we look at, investment is set to fall 
substantially.  
 
One of the primary reasons we are likely to see a fall in investment this year is due 
to the large number of businesses that will/already have shut down. In the CSO’s 
Business Impact Questionnaire, which surveys businesses on how they are dealing 
with COVID-19, approximately 25 per cent of respondents reported that they have 
ceased trading during the lockdown period. This means that over the lockdown 
period one-in-four Irish businesses will engage in no capital expenditure. While the 
hope would be that many of these businesses may be able to resume activity as 
the government restrictions are gradually lifted, it is likely that at least some of 
these businesses will remain shut permanently. 
 
Even for businesses that remain open, investment is likely to be curtailed 
significantly due to the large increase in uncertainty brought on by the pandemic. 
Previous analysis by O’Toole (2019) has shown that an increase in international 
uncertainty leads to a fall in investment in the domestic economy.7 Due to the 
often irreversible nature of capital expenditure, when businesses are unsure about 
future economic conditions, they are unlikely to engage in large capital 
expenditure. Figure 4 shows that, globally, uncertainty is at an all-time high.  
 
FIGURE 4  ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDEX (INDEX)  
 
 




7  O’Toole, C (2019). ‘Global Uncertainty and The Impact on Irish Aggregate Investment’, Quarterly Economic 
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In the current situation uncertainty pertains not only to the medium/long term but 
also to the very near term, with even expert epidemiologists unsure about the 
spread of the virus over the coming weeks. In such an environment, businesses are 
highly unlikely to make large capital expenditures and may be unwilling to do so 
until a clear path out of the current pandemic becomes clear. One minor offsetting 
element may be expenditures on buildings, equipment and machinery that are 
required to implement social distancing guidelines. However, it is not expected 
that these items would offset the expected decline in investment in a significant 
manner.  
 
Figure 5 shows the related but distinct indicator of economic sentiment. This 
indicator is derived from a monthly survey of Irish firms conducted by the European 
Commission and is a composite of five separate confidence indicators related to 
industrial, services, retail, consumers and construction. Even during the height of 
Brexit related uncertainty towards the latter half of 2019, the economic sentiment 
indicator held up reasonably well. However, the most recent data show that 
sentiment has collapsed and that many businesses are highly pessimistic about 
current and future economic conditions. 
 
FIGURE 5 ECONOMIC SENTIMENT (INDEX) 
 
 
Source:  European Commission.  
 
An additional issue that is unique to the current situation, that is likely to curtail 
investment this year, is the supply chain disruption brought about by the 
pandemic. As a result of the general trend towards increased globalisation over 
recent decades, many businesses rely on the importation of intermediary goods 
and services. Due to the lockdown measures imposed by authorities across the 
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likely to be significantly reduced. This means that even if there are domestic 
businesses that are willing to make capital expenditure in the current environment 
their ability to do so may be limited.  
 
Estimating investment expenditure pathways 
To provide pathways for investment across our scenarios, we undertake a 
component-by-component analysis. Modified Gross Fixed Capital Formation can 
be broken down into several sub-components, each likely to be impacted uniquely 
by the economic current situation. Regression analysis indicates that a 1 per cent 
decline in economic sentiment in a given quarter is associated with a 0.6 per cent 
decline in investment in Machinery and Equipment in the same period. This 
suggests that Machinery and Equipment investment is highly reactive to falling 
business confidence and is likely to decline significantly in the current 
environment. On the other hand, Building and Construction, which is the largest 
component of investment, has a weaker association with economic sentiment. This 
likely reflects the long-term nature of investment in construction which makes it 
less reactionary to the current economic situation.  
 
In the Baseline case, where the economy opens gradually as per the government 
plan and enters a recovery period over the second half of the year, investment is 
forecast to fall by 27.6 per cent. In the more Severe scenario where the economy 
is put back into strict lockdown in Q4, investment is forecast to fall by 39.0 per cent 
in 2020. Even in the Benign scenario where the economy is operating normally by 
Q4, investment is forecast to fall by 18.4 per cent this year. Our forecast fall in 
investment is significantly worse than the previous Commentary in March, 
reflecting both the continually deteriorating situation and the reduced likelihood 
of a bounce back in the period following the lockdown. To put these figures in a 
historical context, the largest annual decline in real investment during the financial 
crisis was just under 17 per cent in 2009. 
 
LABOUR MARKET 
The impact of the COVID-19 downturn on the Irish labour market has been 
unprecedented. In April the unemployment rate in the country increased to 
28.2 per cent, up from 15.5 per cent in March and 4.8 per cent in February. Figure 6 
illustrates the substantial rise in unemployment, both in rapidity and scale. 
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FIGURE 6 UNEMPLOYMENT BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The scale of the employment shock can be seen in the number of people either on 
the Live Register or availing of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment, which 
increased to over 815,000 in April. By comparison, in the same period the previous 
year there were just over 193,000 on the Live Register. On top of this, there were 
also over 425,000 people availing of the Wage Subsidy Scheme who do not show 
up in the unemployment figures.  
 
In addition to the size of the employment shock, the distribution of job losses has 
also been uneven across sectors and demographics. Work by Byrne et al., 2020, 
shows that job losses have primarily been concentrated in Accommodation and 
Food Services with the Retail and Construction sectors also significantly impacted. 
In Box 3 in this Commentary, Roantree explores the distribution of job losses across 
various groups. This analysis looks at the difference in unemployment claims and 
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BOX 3  JOB LOSS DISTRIBUTION 
 
The public health measures necessary to supress the spread of COVID-19 have resulted in 
many sectors of the Irish economy being entirely shut down or operating at much reduced 
capacity, leading to widespread job losses. This Box provides some characterisation of the 
extent and distribution of these job losses and temporary lay-offs. 
Since 13 March 2020, anyone aged 18 to 66 who loses their job or is temporarily laid off 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic is entitled to receive a non-means tested payment called 
the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP). Statistics published by the Central Statistics 
Office show that claims for this benefit reached a peak of 602,107 at the end of April before 
falling slightly to 589,638 by 10 May, the latest data available at the time of writing.8  
Given there were an estimated 2,275,400 people aged 18-66 employed or self-employed 
in the last quarter of 2019, these figures suggest that just over a quarter of the workforce 
(25.9 per cent) have lost their job and are currently in receipt of the PUP.9 Claims for the 
payment amongst younger workers represent a far greater share of employment than for 
other age categories. Figure C and Table C show that claims amount to 58.7 per cent of the 
number of 18-19 year olds, 47.3 per cent of the number of 20-24 year olds, and 27.1 per 
cent of the number of 25-34 year olds who were in work at the end of 2019, compared to 
just over a fifth (21.8 per cent) of those aged 35-66.  
 
FIGURE C   PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENT CLAIMS AS % OF EMPLOYMENT LEVEL IN Q4 2019 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations using estimates of Q4 2019 employment from the CSO Labour Force Survey microdata and PUP claims 





8  ‘Detailed COVID-19 Income Support and Live Register Tables’ produced by the CSO, accessed on 19/05/2020 at 
https://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/liveregister/detailedCOVID-19incomesupportandliveregistertables 
9  While employment in the final quarter of the year may be subject to seasonal fluctuations, comparing PUP claims to 
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Table C also shows that claims by men for the payment represent a higher share of 
employment (27.6 per cent) than for women (24.0 per cent), and for those living outside 
Dublin (24.3 per cent) – particularly in the Border region (29.5 per cent). While some of 
this variation is likely due to differences in the sectoral composition of employment by age, 
sex and region, the CSO notes that the sector of previous employment recorded in the 
administrative data PUP is drawn from does not align with those collected in the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), making a similar comparison of sectoral job losses complicated. Byrne 
et al. (2020) show that such a comparison suggests that claims for the payment in certain 
sectors – notably the accommodation and food sector at 70.9 per cent – represent a much 
larger of share of employment than other sectors.10  
However, the PUP is not the only welfare support available to those who have lost their 
job as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. They may be entitled to claim (PRSI contribution 
linked) Jobseeker’s Benefit and (means-tested) Jobseeker’s Allowance, which are more 
generous than the PUP for those eligible to the maximum rate with adult and child 
dependants. Live Register figures from the CSO show that claims for these benefits have 
risen by 13,333 and 19,293 respectively between February and April, though this may 
include some workers who remain in employment but with reduced hours or earnings.11 
Indeed the CSO’s recent special LFS module showed that almost half (48.9 per cent) of 
those who reported having their ‘employment status or situation affected by COVID-19’ 
said they had experienced a ‘change in work hours’, while 15 per cent said they ‘had to 
take unpaid leave’.12  
In addition, there were an estimated 65,000 people above the age of 66 who reported 
being in some form of paid work in the final quarter of 2019. Such workers are not entitled 
to make a claim for the PUP, Jobseeker’s Allowance or – in most cases – Jobseeker’s Benefit 
if they have lost employment, so will not be included in the above statistics. 
As well as those who have lost their job or been temporarily laid off from work, a large 
number of jobs are being supported by the Government’s Temporary Wage Subsidy 
Scheme (TWSS). This allows employers to claim a subsidy of up to €410 per week for 
eligible employees they retain on their payroll, with statistics from Revenue showing that 
more than 464,000 employees of 47,300 employers received at least one payment through 
the scheme between 26 March and 14 May. However, the numbers currently receiving the 
subsidy are somewhat lower than this figure as – to date – 9,700 have moved from the 
TWSS to non-TWSS supported employment, and 43,900 to welfare payments (including 
the PUP) or economic inactivity. Revenue statistics also show that 36 per cent of private 
sector employers have registered for the TWSS, with the overwhelming majority (86 per 
cent) receiving support also making some payment to employees on top of the subsidy. 
The scale of job losses revealed by these figures is unprecedented, far exceeding that seen 




10  Byrne, S., D. Coates, E. Keenan and T. McIndoe-Calder (2020). ‘The Initial Labour Market Impact of COVID-19’. Central 
Bank of Ireland Economic Letter, No. 4, Vol. 2020. http://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/publications/economic-letters/vol-2020-no-4-the-initial-labour-market-impact-of-COVID-19-(byrne-coates-
keenan-mcindoe-calder).pdf?sfvrsn=4  
11  CSO Table LRM01 ‘Persons on Live Register by Social Welfare Scheme, Age Group, Sex and Month’. 
12  Tables 2c and 2d in CSO statistical release ‘Employment and Life Effects of COVID-19’, available at 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/elec19/employmentandlifeeffectsofCOVID-19. 
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coming weeks as certain sectors of the economy reopen, employment in other sectors is 
likely to be constrained by the need to comply with public health measures and reduced 
demand. For example, just under 490,000 people worked in the wholesale and retail trade 
or accommodation and food service sectors in the final quarter of 2019, representing 
20.7 per cent of total employment. These sectors are likely to face particular challenges in 
the months ahead, as will many employers who are currently only retaining workers on 
their payrolls with support from the TWSS, which is due to expire in its current form along 
with the PUP in June. As a result, the revised design of these benefits will be a key policy 
question in the months ahead, with important implications for the labour market and 
household incomes.  
TABLE C  PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENT CLAIMS AS % OF EMPLOYMENT 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 PUP claims at 10/5/2020 
Aged 18-66 in 
work, Q4 2019 Col. 1/Col 2 (%) 
Total 589,638 2,275,420 25.9% 
    
Age:      
18/19 26,959 45,908 58.7% 
20-24 93,309 197,259 47.3% 
25-34 135,223 498,211 27.1% 
35-44 141,610 634,202 22.3% 
45-54 111,759 528,128 21.2% 
55-59 43,591 204,893 21.3% 
60-66 37,187 166,820 22.3% 
       
Sex:    
Men 335,989 1,216,696 27.6% 
Women 253,649 1,058,723 24.0% 
       
Region of residence (NUTS3):    
Border 51,586 174,834 29.5% 
West  55,192 210,292 26.2% 
Mid-West  54,823 207,092 26.5% 
South-East  52,211 186,379 28.0% 
South-West  82,964 325,412 25.5% 
Dublin 171,874 706,926 24.3% 
Mid-East  85,828 335,452 25.6% 
Midlands  33,292 129,034 25.8% 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations using estimates of Q4 2019 employment from the CSO’s Labour Force Survey microdata and figures 
from the ‘Detailed COVID-19 Income Support and Live Register Tables’ for the week ending 10/5/2020. 
 
This Box was prepared by Barra Roantree. 
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The path for the labour market over the rest of the year will be dependent on the 
performance of the underlying economy and has been modelled in line with our 
three scenarios. 
 
Under the Baseline scenario the unemployment rate is set to average 17.4 per cent 
for the year. Unemployment is likely to peak in Q2 during the strictest phase of the 
lockdown, averaging just over 24 per cent. As the restrictions are lifted and 
consumption and investment pick back up over the latter half of the year, the 
demand for labour will also increase resulting in the unemployment rate declining 
to just under 17 per cent in Q4. 
 
Under the Severe scenario the unemployment rate for the year will average 
19.4 per cent. The most significant difference between the Severe scenario and 
Baseline scenario is the spike in unemployment in Q4. This is a result of the return 
to lockdown in Q4 which will cause unemployment to return to a similar rate as Q2.  
 
In the Benign scenario there is a rapid improvement in the labour market over the 
latter half of the year, with the unemployment rate reaching 11.2 per cent in Q4 
and averaging 15.2 per cent for the year. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Figure 7 plots the growth rates for the main taxation items for the period January 
to April, from 2016 to 2020. Most items registered significant growth in January 
and February before the impacts of COVID-19 started to impact in March and April.  
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FIGURE 7 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%): JANUARY – APRIL 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
 
For the year to date, income tax receipts are still registering growth of nearly 8 per 
cent with respect to the same period in 2019. Interestingly, pay related social 
insurance (PRSI) returns are up by over 10 per cent. However, both income tax 
receipts and PRSI returns are likely to register significant negative growth for the 
year, as the COVID-19 downturn fully impacts the domestic economy. 
 
Corporation taxes also witnessed a significant increase for the first four months of 
the year with receipts in February of €460 million almost double what they are 
typically for this time of the year. However, it should be noted that this is usually a 
quiet time of the year for these returns with the amounts accounting for 
approximately 2 per cent of the annual amount. 
 
The full impacts of the COVID-19 related slowdown on the Irish public finances are 
particularly difficult to estimate. While the expenditure measures already 
implemented may be extended, the real difficulty lies in the potential impact of the 
slowdown on taxation receipts. The following Box outlines some of the challenges 
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BOX 4 HOW MUCH ARE GOVERNMENT TAXATION RECEIPTS LIKELY TO FALL DUE TO THE 
COVID-19 SLOWDOWN? 
In order to assess the likely implications for the public finances in this Box we draw on 
previous research which examined the sensitivity of taxation revenue to underlying 
economic activity (Deli et al., 2017). By taking parameters which have quantified the 
relationship between economic activity and taxation receipts from the earlier study, we 
can nowcast the level of taxation receipts for the present year, by using our nowcast/ 
forecast of economic activity for 2020. 
Figure D plots the ratio of these receipts to Irish GNP over the same period. 
FIGURE D RATIO OF GOVERNMENT TAXATION RECEIPTS TO GNP (%): 1984 – 2019 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
From the mid-1990s onwards with the emergence of the Celtic Tiger, the decline in total 
tax receipts as a percentage of output is evident. 
In Table D we break out the annual declines in the main taxation aggregates over the post-
Celtic Tiger period. 
TABLE D ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN SELECT TAXATION AGGREGATES: 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
Income tax -3.0 -10.7 -4.8 
VAT -7.6 -23.0 -5.5 
Corporation -23.2 -26.1 0.6 
Excise -7.0 -14.6 -0.5 
Total -14.7 -21.0 -4.0 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Much of the decline in taxation receipts during this period can be traced back to the 
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Smyth and McQuinn (2016) for more on this). However, it is notable that receipts from 
corporation taxes also registered a substantial decline over the period. In 2010 corporation 
tax receipts were only just 61 per cent of the equivalent 2007 total. This highlights the 
impact of a global slowdown on Irish taxation receipts. 
The empirical results from Deli et al., (2017) suggest an elasticity of approximately 1.1 for 
total taxation receipts with respect to underlying economic activity. That is a 10 per cent 
reduction in output levels results in total taxation receipts declining by 11 per cent. 
Therefore, given our forecast that output is set to contract by over 12 per cent in 2020, 
that would indicate that taxation receipts will decline from €59.3 billion in 2019 to just 
over €51 billion in 2020. In total, we expect that under our Baseline scenario, total taxation 
receipts will fall by 16 per cent in 2020. 
However, these estimates do come with a significant degree of uncertainty. First of all, the 
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic is unique in that it involves an almost complete cessation 
in activity for specific sectors of the economy. Therefore, it may be the case that taxation 
receipts closely associated with this type of activity such as VAT and excise duty may 
register even larger decreases then what is envisaged in this exercise. Like all the scenarios 
examined in this Commentary, it is still unclear how the administrative measures are going 
to be relaxed in the coming weeks and months. This will have a direct impact on the level 
of economic activity and hence taxation receipts which will be generated. Even with the 
relaxing of the administrative measures, it is still not clear how consumers will modify their 
behaviour in response to the pandemic. Again, this will have a significant impact on the 
subsequent pick-up in economic activity.  
A final degree of uncertainty concerns the likely outcome for corporation tax. Implicit in 
our estimate is that in 2020 corporation tax receipts will be down by 10 per cent compared 
with 2019. However, as is clearly evidenced from Table D, at the time of the international 
financial crisis of 2007/2008, corporation tax receipts fell dramatically by almost 40 per 
cent between 2007 and 2010. It is exceptionally difficult to estimate at this point in the 
year what the likely impact of the global slowdown will be on Irish corporation tax receipts.  
References: 
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housing market’, The Economic and Social Review, Vol 41 (2), pp.201-223. 
Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2016). ‘Assessing the sustainable nature of housing-
related taxation receipts: The case of Ireland’, Journal of European Real Estate Research, 
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This Box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn. 
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Under our Baseline outlook, and given our assumption about the impacts of 
COVID-19 on consumption, trade and the labour market, it is evident that certain 
tax headings such as income tax, VAT and PRSI receipts are likely to be adversely 
impacted for Q2 2020. Similarly, on the expenditure side, the Government has 
committed significant additional resources to addressing the outbreak of the virus. 
For our Baseline scenario, we assume that Government expenditure for the year is 
that outlined in the recent Stability Programme Update (SPU).13 Given the 
expected decline in taxation receipts outlined in the Box and the increased 
expenditure, this would mean a deficit of €27 billion or 8 per cent of GDP is now 
likely in 2020. However, this figure may increase as the year unfolds. For example, 
we assume that the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) is discontinued after 
June of 2020 with the more standard welfare payments applying thereafter. Also, 
the expenditure figure does not contain any amount for a fiscal stimulus in the 
current year. 
 
In terms of funding the sovereign debt, in April the National Treasury Management 
Agency (NTMA) announced a revised bond funding range of €20 billion to 
€24 billion for the full year 2020. This replaces the original bond funding range, 
announced in December 2019, of €10 billion to €14 billion. The revision is due to 
the worsening fiscal situation and, in particular, the increase of €14 billion in the 
Government’s Exchequer Borrowing Requirement due to measures related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
The increase in the bond funding range is lower than the increase in the Exchequer 
Borrowing Requirement due to Ireland’s strong cash position. The NTMA has 
already issued over €11 billion of bonds in 2020. This has been achieved through 
the launch of two new bonds maturing in 2027 and 2035 and an auction of bonds 
maturing in 2029. There are further bond auctions scheduled for May and June 
2020. In another Box, McQuinn examines the impact of the deteriorating economic 





13  See https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/43a6dd-stability-programme-update-2020/ for more details. 
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BOX 5 WHAT ARE THE SHORT-RUN IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SPREADS ON IRISH BOND YIELDS 
OF THE COVID-19 DOWNTURN? 
As noted in the Commentary, like most economies, the impact of the COVID-19 downturn 
on the Irish economy has been substantial and swift with both economic activity and 
income levels set to decline quite significantly in 2020 compared with 2019 levels. It is also 
clear that the response of the Irish authorities to the downturn in terms of the additional 
welfare payments coupled with the likely decline in taxation revenues will result in a 
significant deterioration in key fiscal metrics such as the General Government Balance and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
Inevitably, given the deterioration in these key variables across a wide number of 
countries, increased attention will focus on the response of financial markets to these 
developments. If financial markets believe that individual countries will have difficulties in 
meeting their repayment obligations on their debt levels then, ceterus paribus, this will 
result in increased borrowing costs for the governments in question. One key indicator of 
financial market’s reaction in this regard is the yield spread, which captures the financial 
market’s view of the sovereign’s ability to meet repayment obligations on its debt. The 
spread is usually measured as the spread of the Government bond over a risk-free interest 
rate. This spread should be informed principally by the Government debt position and the 
ability of the economy to service that debt. 
De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013) use this as their guiding principle in modelling sovereign 
risk within the Euro Area, with the yield spread being modelled as a function of a number 
of fundamental variables. Any deviation of the observed spread from that determined by 
such factors serves as a measure of mis-pricing by the market: if the actual spread is less 
than the fundamental factors-determined value, the market is seen as unduly optimistic 
about the country’s fiscal prospects and, likewise, if the difference is positive, it is too 
pessimistic. Cronin et al. (2019) build on the work by De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013) to 
specify and estimate a model for the spreads on Irish bond yields. In this Box, we update 
the model and use the results to estimate the impact of a deterioration in key fiscal and 
economic variables on Irish bond spreads. Figure E plots the spread on Irish bond yields 
from 2000 to 2019. From the chart it is clear that the spread on Irish bonds increased 
sharply between 2008 and 2011.  
FIGURE E ACTUAL SPREADS (%) ON IRISH BOND YIELDS: Q1 2000 – Q1 2020 
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This reflected the exposure of the Irish State to the difficulties in the domestic banking 
sector particularly after the enactment of the bank guarantee in 2008. Therefore, in an 
Irish context, given the role played by the troubles of the financial sector and its 
relationship with national fiscal policy, the De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013) model is 
augmented by Cronin et al. (2019) to include financial sector variables. The model is 
specified as follows:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼3(𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)           (1) 
where the spread is the average within-the-quarter daily yield spread of the Irish sovereign 
ten-year bond over the EONIA rate; debt is the General Government debt-to-GNI* ratio; 
Income is real household disposable income (included to capture the ability of the 
economy to support the fiscal position); Bank is a banking exposure variable; DV is a 
dummy variable whose value is zero from Q1 2000 to Q3 2008 and whose value is one 
from Q4 2008 to Q4 2019. The updated model is estimated over the period Q1 2000 to 
Q4 2019 and the results are summarised in Table E. 
TABLE E  IRISH SOVEREIGN BOND SPREADS ESTIMATION RESULTS: Q1 2000 – Q4 2019 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant 6.161 5.457 
Debt 0.0081 2.539 
Income -0.00028 -4.988 





Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Note:  N = 80. 
 
The coefficients have the expected sign with both debt and banking having positive signs 
(higher debt and banking burdens raise the spread) and the income variable has a negative 
coefficient (i.e. higher income indicates a greater ability of the economy to support the 
sovereign, hence reducing default risk and, consequently, the fitted spread). The 
goodness-of-fit measure is 0.74. 
We now use the results from the re-estimated model to assess the impact of the COVID-19 
deterioration in the Irish economy and public finances on the fundamentals-determined 
bond spread. We generate an estimate of what the bond spread would be like in Q2 2020 
based on certain forecast paths for the independent variables in (1). For the banking 
variable, we assume there is no change from its Q1 2020 level. For disposable income we 
forecast there is a 4 per cent fall in Q2. We forecast that GNI falls by 10 per cent in the 
same period, while the national debt is expected to increase by €7 billion for Q2. The 
difference between the expected decline in income and economic output is due to the 
relatively comprehensive nature of the support packages provided by the Irish State. As 
noted by Beirne et al. (2020), the measures announced by the Government, notably the  
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flat-rate Pandemic Unemployment Payment of €350 per week, reduce the number of 
households exposed to significant income losses by about a third. 
TABLE F  SIMULATION RESULTS 
Actual Bond Spread Q1 2020 Simulated Bond Spread Q2 2020 
0.443 1.173 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
The effect of the shock is to increase the spread on Irish bonds from its current level in 
Q1 2020 of 0.443 to 1.173. The biggest impact is the change in the income variable, 
followed by the assumed decline in GNI. This is placed in a recent historical context in 
Figure F. 
FIGURE F ACTUAL AND SIMULATED SPREADS (%) ON IRISH BOND YIELDS: Q1 2016 – Q2 2020 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
 
The impact of the shock is to cause the spread to increase back up to 2018 levels. Clearly, 
if economic and fiscal conditions continue to decline through 2020, the simulation would 
indicate that the spread would continue to increase. 
To date European institutions, including the European Central Bank have announced a 
number of measures aimed at maintaining borrowing costs for individual countries at the 
low levels which prevailed before the current crisis. The actions of European institutions 
and financial market perceptions of sovereign risks will cause a difference between what 
the fundamentals might suggest would happen to a country’s bond spread and what 
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This Box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn. 
 
We summarise the resulting implications for our forecasts of the debt-to-output 
ratios in Figure 8. By the end of 2020, we believe the debt-to-GDP ratio will be back 
up to 76 per cent while debt-to-GNI* will have increased to almost below 
127 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 8 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
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The Irish economy like most of its counterparts across Europe and the western 
world is in the middle of an extraordinary decline unlike anything ever witnessed 
before. As domestic authorities continue to deploy measures to curb the spread of 
the COVID-19 virus, the administrative closures initially announced by the Irish 
Government on 13 March have only started to be eased. On 1 May, the 
Government outlined a five-phase roadmap for lifting the COVID-19 restrictions. 
While necessary from the point of view of public health, the gradual lifting of 
restrictions as opposed to a complete lifting will have implications for the initial 
scale of the economic shock, and for the speed with which the domestic economy 
recovers. 
 
In this Commentary we update our assessment of the economic impact of 
COVID-19 on the economy for the present year. Our policy of analysing the impact 
through the use of scenario analysis in the Spring Commentary rather than a 
standard forecast is repeated in the present Commentary. Given the uncertainty 
around the potential duration of the administrative measures, we present three 
different scenarios – a Benign (pandemic suppression), Baseline and Severe case. 
These three scenarios are necessary given the continued uncertainty concerning 
the spread of COVID-19 and possible additional containment measures that may 
have to be put in place.  
 
All three scenarios are based on the timelines in the Government Roadmap for 
reopening the domestic economy with varying economic and epidemiological 
development paths for the rest of the year. The scenarios are as follows:  
1)  ‘a new normal’ Baseline which assumes physical and social distancing 
continue until the end of 2020;  
2)  ‘a second wave’ Severe scenario of strict lockdowns in October; and  
3)  a ‘pandemic suppression’ Benign scenario that allows a return to normal 
economic activity in Quarter 4.  
 
In our Baseline, which we consider our most likely scenario, economic activity in 
2020 is set to decline by over 12 per cent. Unemployment will reach 17 per cent 
for 2020 and the public finances will deteriorate such that a deficit of 8 per cent of 
GDP or €27 billion is now likely to be recorded for the year. This latter figure may 
increase depending on the fiscal response of the Government over the latter half 
of the year. 
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Under our Severe scenario, we assume that a second wave of the virus results in 
another 12-week lockdown commencing in October 2020. This results in another 
significant decline in consumption and investment in the domestic economy. We 
also accompany these developments with a more severe external shock to the 
economy. Under such a scenario, economic output declines by over 17 per cent in 
the current year. 
 
Finally, in our Benign scenario, we assume that the economy returns to normal by 
Q4. Under this scenario output is forecast to decline by over 8 per cent. This is akin 
to the scenario we outlined in our Spring QEC and is also accompanied by a more 
benign outlook for the international economy.  
 
In the Commentary we examine a number of COVID-19 related issues in some 
detail. A detailed breakdown of job losses in the economy due to COVID-19 is 
provided in Box A by Roantree. In particular, the Box notes that in terms of those 
in receipt of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP), younger workers 
appear to constitute a higher proportion of recipients as do those previously 
employed in the accommodation and food sectors. The Box raises important issues 
concerning the impact of these payments on the recovery of the economy. For 
example, if these payments were reduced or withdrawn, what would the impact 
on consumption be? Also, given that some of these payments are greater than the 
standard job-seeking allowance, what implications would the continuation of the 
payments have for re-employment possibilities when the economy starts to 
recover? 
 
In terms of assessing the impact of the global slowdown on the domestic economy, 
the Commentary draws heavily on analysis that is conducted using COSMO, the 
macro-econometric model of the Irish economy. In a Box to the Commentary 
Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez use COSMO to examine the impact of a number of 
global scenarios on Irish exports. The Box indicates that the external demand for 
Irish goods and services is likely to face significant declines in the present year. 
 
A Special Article to this Commentary by Brick, Walsh, Keegan and Lyons examines 
the most up-to-date data available on Emergency Department (ED) attendances in 
Irish public hospitals, to observe if the number of attendances has changed since 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the introduction of the associated delay 
measures by the Government. While there are a number of reasons for reducing 
demand for ED care, Brick et al. argue it is peoples’ behaviour which is likely to be 
the main factor. They argue that further public information campaigns may be 
required to encourage and reassure people with symptoms to contact their GP or 
attend an ED.  
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While to date many of the supports have been targeted at supporting incomes and 
providing emergency lending and other supports to firms, in terms of the recovery 
path of the Irish economy, a fiscal stimulus to kick start economic activity is 
warranted in the second half of the present year, as the administrative measures 
are eased. Notwithstanding the strong and resilient nature of growth in the Irish 
economy prior to the COVID-19 shock, the economy is still likely to be very fragile 
in the short to medium term. However, given the small open nature of the 
domestic economy, such a stimulus would have to be carefully considered. In 
another Box to this Commentary FitzGerald highlights the significant increase in 
personal savings amongst Irish households which is likely to occur due both to the 
nature of the slowdown, and the response of the authorities in terms of the welfare 
transfers, which have been implemented. FitzGerald estimates that the Irish 
savings rate could double to almost 20 per cent in 2020. Furthermore, he notes 
that spending of these private savings could constitute a considerable stimulus for 
the domestic economy in 2021 or 2022. This analysis does rely on household 
income levels being maintained at current levels, which will be challenging the 
longer the pandemic-related downturn goes on. 
 
One of the most complicated aspects of the Government’s policy response will be 
how to support firms, both large enterprises and SMEs as the domestic economy 
reopens. If restrictions such as physical distancing remain in place, many 
businesses may struggle to return in a viable form. While it too early to know 
which, and how many, firms this will apply to, difficult choices will have to be made 
in terms of enterprise supports. Not all firms will be able to survive. To date many 
policies have expanded offerings of debt and lending facilitation measures (such as 
credit guarantees). To maximise the chances of survival, and ensure indebtedness 
remains low, where feasible policy could aim at expanding grants and other 
solutions that would provide direct cash injections to firms. While the existing 
wage subsidy scheme is the most important of these type to date, further 
COVID-19 specific examples may include investment grants to help transform 
businesses for social distancing etc. 
 
In the short to medium term, the Government could increase investment in a 
number of different areas as a means of stimulating the domestic economy. 
Certain significant infrastructural projects could be advanced and projects which 
target environmental sustainability and climate goals could also be prioritised. 
Another area which should be considered is a significant increase in the provision 
of social and affordable housing. This would simultaneously meet the objective of 
stimulating economic activity, while also addressing a key economic and social 
policy issue. Actual housing supply has consistently fallen short of the underlying 
structural demand for housing in the Irish economy, with Corrigan et al. (2019), 
amongst others, highlighting the lack of affordable housing particularly in the 
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greater Dublin area.14 Furthermore, recent research by Allen-Coghlan and 
McQuinn (2020)15 which assesses the implication of the COVID-19 downturn on 
the residential housing market, argues that over the longer term the bigger impact 
of COVID-19 may be on the supply side of the Irish market as the construction 
sector is likely to be impacted for the rest of 2020. This will exacerbate the ongoing 
imbalance between housing supply and the structural demand for housing. While 
previously, the concern may have been that such a policy might lead to 
‘overheating’ pressures given the strong pace of growth in the Irish economy, this 
concern is, clearly, no longer applicable. 
 
Clearly the fiscal costs of the crisis are substantial. Our analysis would suggest 
under the baseline scenario, the deficit is set to increase to at least 9 per cent of 
GDP or €27 billion in monetary terms. Therefore, in order for a housing related 
stimulus to be sustainable from a public finances perspective, it is imperative that 
EU institutions continue to keep sovereign borrowing costs as low as possible for 
as long as possible. While Eurogroup finance ministers have agreed to mobilise the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to support member states by providing 
additional funds to the ESM to lend to member states facing a crisis at concessional 
rates, it is still unclear whether, for example, ESM funding can be used to support 
economic measures beyond health care costs. Additionally, there is also no formal 
agreement about alternative sources of EU funding such as euro or ‘Corona Bonds’. 
Whelan (2020)16 has outlined some of the challenges the ECB is likely to incur if it 
were to provide a significant stimulus. Nonetheless, clear and specific guidance 
from European institutions concerning the fiscal strategies available to member 
state countries is essential over the coming months. The recent Franco-German 
proposal for the development of a recovery plan providing direct budgetary 
support to affected areas and regions is a step in the right direction and, by using 
grants rather than loan finance, would appear to be targeted correctly.  
 
Declining house prices as well as major increases in unemployment are clear 
indicators of pending issues in relation to mortgage arrears. To date the income 
supports, as well as repayment breaks, have likely allowed many borrowers to 
cushion the economic shock. However, if support payments are tapered and 
payment breaks expire, this will inevitably lead to higher arrears which will require 
some form of modification or management. Ensuring these dynamics do not 




14  Corrigan, E., D. Foley, K. McQuinn, R. Slaymaker and C. O’Toole (2019), ‘Exploring affordability in the Irish housing 
market’, The Economic and Social Review . 
15  Allen-Coghlan M. and K. McQuinn (2020). ‘Property prices and COVID-19 related administrative closures: What are the 
implications?’. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) Working Paper 661. Available online at: 
 https://www.esri.ie/system/files/publications/WP661_0.pdf 
16  Whelan K. (2020). ‘The ECB’s Mandate and Legal Constraints’, EU Commission Monetary Dialogue Papers June. 
Available online at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207502/Whelan_FINAL%20online.pdf 
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stability considerations will become increasingly important as the depth and 
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COVID-19 AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT ATTENDANCES IN IRISH 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
 
Aoife Brick, Brendan Walsh, Conor Keegan and Seán Lyons1,2 
ABSTRACT 
On 29 February 2020 the first confirmed case of COVID-19 was announced in the 
Republic of Ireland. In subsequent weeks, progressively more restrictive control 
measures were introduced in an attempt to ‘flatten the curve’ and specifically to 
relieve pressure on emergency and critical care services. Using the most up to date 
data available on emergency department (ED) attendances in acute public 
hospitals, this analysis examines the impact on the numbers and types of 
attendances since the onset of COVID-19. Our analysis shows that there were on 
average 45.4 per cent fewer ED attendances per day in the week ending 31 March 
compared to the week ending 1 March. In addition, the reduction in ED 
attendances appears to be more prevalent in younger age groups. We also show 
that the proportion of ED attendances across triage categories, used to assess 
urgency of treatment, remained stable with no substantive changes in the overall 
proportion of very urgent/immediate attendances. Public information campaigns 
must encourage people to contact GPs and attend EDs if they require emergency 
care, and healthcare facilities must ensure that it is safe to do so. 
INTRODUCTION 
On 29 February 2020 the first confirmed case of COVID-19 was announced in the 
Republic of Ireland. Since then, progressively restrictive control measures have 
been introduced in an effort to prevent further spread of the disease (or ‘flatten 
the curve’) and ease pressure on hospital resources. On 13 March all schools, 
colleges and childcare facilities closed, and on 28 March guidance was issued from 
the Government for the public to stay at home in all but a specified set of 
circumstances, and all but essential services were closed (NPHET, 2020). On 1 May 
the Government published a roadmap for reopening society and business 




1  Aoife Brick, Brendan Walsh, and Conor Keegan are Research Officers at the Economic and Social Research Institute and 
Adjunct Assistant Professors at Trinity College Dublin. Seán Lyons is an Associate Research Professor at the Economic 
and Social Research Institute and Adjunct Associate Professor at Trinity College Dublin. 
2  This research was conducted under the Department of Health funded ESRI Research Programme in Healthcare Reform. 
The authors would like to thank the HSE for providing the data necessary for the analysis, and the Department of Health 
and Sheelah Connolly for comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The views presented in this Article are those of 
the authors alone and do not represent the views of the HSE, Department of Health, or the Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
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restrictions across five phases beginning on 18 May and on a three-week review 
process. 
 
Attempts to ‘flatten the curve’ are partly intended to ameliorate COVID-19 demand 
pressure on the acute hospital sector, specifically emergency and critical care 
services. Similar to other countries, Ireland has rapidly implemented substantial 
changes to its health system to prepare for the prospect of significantly increased 
demand. In addition, demand for emergency care not related to COVID-19 also 
appears to have declined rapidly. The net effect of these changes has been a 
dramatic reduction in emergency department (ED) capacity utilisation.3 For 
example, for many years Irish EDs have had large numbers of patients on trolleys 
in EDs, waiting for long periods for a bed in a ward. Within two weeks of the 
announcement of the first case of COVID-19 in the Republic of Ireland, this form of 
queuing had essentially stopped (see Figure 1). The additional capacity created by 




FIGURE 1 TROLLEYS OCCUPIED IN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS, JANUARY – MARCH 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE TrolleyGAR, https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/campaigns/trolleygar.html 
Note: Number of patients awaiting admissions to an inpatient hospital bed at 8am. Presented as a seven-day moving average. 
 
The need to manage the flow of hospital admissions is further necessitated due to 
acute care bed capacity being amongst the lowest in the OECD. At the outset of 




3  Anyone with suspected COVID-19 symptoms was requested to self-isolate and phone their GP. They were told not to 
go to a GP surgery, pharmacy, or hospital (https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/472f64-covid-19-coronavirus-guidance-
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248 (HSE, 2019) for its 4.9 million population. However, capacity was increased, 
and as of 13 April the total stock of critical care beds stood at 500 (excluding 
additional surge capacity) (HSE, 2020).4 This includes capacity made available by 
the private hospital system; on 24 March private hospitals and the Government 
agreed that during this crisis such facilities would operate essentially as public 
hospitals (Department of the Taoiseach, 2020). This agreement, signed on 
30 March, provided over 2,000 acute beds and 47 critical care beds in addition to 
ventilators and laboratories for testing (Thomas et al., 2020). In addition to 
increasing capacity, a substantial proportion of elective hospital care was cancelled 
or postponed to free-up further workforce and bed capacity for patients 
presenting with COVID-19. 
 
COVID-19 is having significant impacts on peoples’ willingness and ability to access 
timely healthcare. Serious concerns have been raised by clinicians that patients are 
foregoing necessary healthcare. In response to reports of non-COVID related 
attendances to hospital EDs reducing considerably, Chief Medical Officer at the 
Department of Health, Dr Tony Holohan, stated on 2 April:  
While protecting yourself from COVID-19 is a priority, no one should 
ignore signs that they may need medical attention for other ailments 
such as lumps, chest pain or other concerns. Please do not ignore any 
symptom outside of COVID-19. The hospitals are there for all 
ailments, not just COVID-19 (NPHET, 2020). 
 
For countries such as China, Iran and Italy that saw the earliest severe 
consequences of COVID-19, there is little evidence available to date of the full 
extent of impacts on ED services. A recent paper examining data from five hospitals 
in Italy has shown a considerable reduction (up to 88 per cent) in visits to paediatric 
EDs in March 2020 compared with the same month in 2019 (Lazzerini et al., 2020). 
More substantial data are emerging from other countries, including England and 
Scotland, which show large decreases in ED attendances since the onset of the 
pandemic. Data from NHS England for March 2020 showed a drop in ED 
attendances of 29.4 per cent on the same month in 2019 (NHS England, 2020). 
While in Scotland there has been a corresponding drop of approximately one-third 
in ED attendances (Public Health Scotland, 2020). 
 
This paper examines the most up-to-date data available on ED attendances in Irish 
public hospitals, to observe if the number of attendances has changed since the 
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and/or the introduction of the associated delay 
measures by the Government. The paper also investigates whether changes in ED 
attendances have occurred at similar rates across age-groups. Finally, based on the 
triage status of ED patients, we examine the extent of differences in the urgency 




4  Of these 500 beds, 415 were open and staffed (HSE, 2020). 
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PATIENT EXPERIENCE TIME DATA 
The data employed for the analysis are from the Patient Experience Time (PET) 
database managed by the Business Information Unit at the Health Service 
Executive. This administrative patient level dataset contains records for all ED 
attendances across the 30 EDs in Irish public hospitals (see Appendix Table A.1). 
The data cover all attendances from 1 January 2019 to 31 March 2020. The data do 
not include attendances at minor injury clinics, Acute Medical/Surgical Assessment 
Units (AMAU/ASAU), presentations to specialist public hospital EDs (e.g. maternity 
hospitals) or EDs in private hospitals. 
 
As a consequence of missing information for some attendances, 1.4 per cent of 
attendances have been excluded from the analysis (Appendix Table A.2). The main 
reason for exclusion was the apparent misclassification of AMAU/ASAU 
attendances.5 Approximately 40 per cent of the excluded cases were from a single 
hospital. 
 
PET gathers information on hospital of attendance, age, sex, date of attendance, 
ED referral status, and discharge destination. PET has also begun to gather 
information on attendances’ triage status. PET uses the Manchester Triage System 
to assign clinical priority to patients based on presenting signs and symptoms (HSE 
Emergency Medicine Programme, 2018). A score between one and five is given to 
each attendance with one being the most severe indicating immediate care 
required and five indicating not urgent. The Manchester Triage System score is a 
new variable in the PET dataset and as such some hospitals are not yet reporting 
it. Additionally, some hospitals have a high number of attendances where triage 
was ‘not classified’.6 After exclusions, approximately 63 per cent of ED attendances 
in both February and March 2020 remain for analysis of triage. We observe broad 
agreement in the overall proportions of patients in each triage category compared 
to a recent European study (Zachariasse et al., 2017). 
 
While PET data may include patients attending with COVID-19 it does not yet 




5  Any attendance with a discharge destination of ‘Referred to AMAU’ or ‘Referred to ASAU’ has been excluded. We have 
crossed checked with HIPE data for 2019 which record all discharges from AMAU/ASAU, and hospitals with some of 
the largest AMAUs have no record in the PET data of referrals to AMAU/ASAU. In addition, all attendances in one 
hospital with a PET of ≤5 minutes and a discharge destination of ‘admitted to ward’ have been excluded as they appear 
to be misclassification of activity other than ED attendances. 
6  While the PET file has data on triage for a selection of hospitals in 2019 some larger hospitals did not report until 
January 2020. For this reason, our analysis focuses on February and March 2020 when the largest number of hospitals 
(16 hospitals) were reporting. 




Figure 2 illustrates the total number of attendances in Irish public hospital EDs 
between 1 January 2019 and 31 March 2020. In January and February year-on-year 
decreases in the number of attendances were observed, 8.6 per cent and 4.2 per 
cent respectively (6.7 per cent excluding 29 February). The number of attendances 
in March 2020 (n=77,932) was 32.5 per cent less than in March 2019 (n=115,497). 
There is some variation in these figures from year to year (see Appendix 
Figure A.1); however the sizeable further reduction in March 2020 is likely to be 
associated with the initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
FIGURE 2 ED ATTENDANCES JANUARY 2019 – MARCH 2020 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
 
Although Figure 2 shows a noticeable reduction in ED attendances in March 2020, 
delay measures were only introduced in mid-March. To help illustrate the time 
profile of the decline over shorter time periods, Figure 3 presents a seven-day 
moving average of daily ED attendances from 1 January to 31 March across the 
30 EDs. The data are presented as a seven-day average to smooth fluctuations in 
attendances that happen at weekends in the normal course of events, and to 
provide for a more interpretable trend over time. Between 1 January and 
29 February, the number of attendances averaged between 3,200 and 3,700 per 
day. The average number of daily attendances in the week ending 1 March was 
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Figure 3 indicates that the number of attendances began to decrease 
approximately one week before the first delay measures were introduced and a 
few days after the first confirmed case was announced.7 
 
FIGURE 3 ED ATTENDANCES 01 JANUARY 2020 – 31 MARCH 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
 
3.2 Referral patterns 
The main pathways to the ED in Ireland are through a General Practitioner (GP) 
referral (surgery or out-of-hours), or a self-referral, with self-referral being the 
predominant route. In Q1 of 2019, 36.0 per cent of attendances were referred by 
a GP (Table 1) with a further 51.9 per cent self-referring. In Q1 2020, there was a 
decrease in the proportion of GP referrals to 33.6 per cent and an increase in the 
proportion of self-referrals to 55.6 per cent. Looking at March in particular, the 
introduction of COVID-19 delay measures appears to be associated with a 
reduction in the number of attendances across all referral sources; a reduction in 
the proportion of attendances referred by a GP from 35.1 per cent to 30.2 per cent; 
and an increase in self-referrals from 54.6 per cent to 58.9 per cent between March 
2019 and March 2020. This may be indicative of lower GP use in March 2020, 
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TABLE 1 TOTAL ATTENDANCES BY SOURCE OF REFERRAL, Q1 2019/20 
 2019 2020 
 GP Referral Self-Referral Other GP Referral Self-Referral Other 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
January 40,898 36.4 54,353 48.3 17,165 15.3 36,275 35.4 55,287 53.9 11,046 10.8 
February 37,411 36.7 53,945 52.9 10,574 10.4 33,635 34.5 53,316 54.7 10,454 10.7 
March 39,687 35.1 61,769 54.6 11,621 10.3 22,892 30.2 44,632 58.9 8,292 10.9 
Q1 Total 117,996 36.0 170,067 51.9 39,360 12.0 92,802 33.6 153,235 55.6 29,792 10.8 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across tables/figures may vary due to missing values for particular variables. 
 
3.3 Admissions to hospital 
Figure 4 shows that in general just over one in every four of those attending at EDs 
are subsequently admitted to the hospital. The numbers admitted to hospital and 
not admitted (the majority are discharged home) both saw reductions in March 
2020. Figure 4 shows that the number of patients admitted from EDs in March 2020 
was 25 per cent lower than the number admitted from EDs in March 2019, and 
16 per cent lower than were admitted from EDs in February 2020. Admitted 
patients did compose a slightly larger proportion (27.9 per cent) of ED attendances 
in March 2020 than earlier months. 
 
FIGURE 4 ED ATTENDANCES BY ADMISSION STATUS, Q1 2019/2020 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across tables/figures may vary due to missing values for particular variables. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the rise in the proportion of ED attendances admitted to 
hospital was concentrated in the last two weeks of March. This increase began in 
a more modest way immediately prior to the introduction of the first delay 
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COVID-19 admissions; however a total of just over 600 COVID-19 positive patients 
(HSE, 2020) had been admitted to hospital as of 31 March, so COVID-19 is unlikely 
to be the main driver behind this increase. 
 
FIGURE 5 ADMISSIONS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL ED ATTENDANCES, 01 JANUARY 2020 – 
31 MARCH 2020 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Presented as a seven-day moving average. 
 
3.4 Age profile 
The reduction in the number of ED attendances was not evenly distributed across 
age groups. The largest reductions were seen in the three youngest age groups 
(Figure 6) with 36 per cent to 50 per cent reductions in attendances per 1,000 
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FIGURE 6 ED ATTENDANCES BY AGE GROUP, N AND RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION, MARCH 
2019/2020 
Attendances – N 
    March 2019  March 2020 
 
     
Attendances – Rate per 1,000 Population 
   




Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Notes: Totals across tables/figures may vary due to missing values for age. Percentage change in square brackets. Population 
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3.5 Triage 
With a large decrease in the number of attendances between February and March 
2020 we might expect that the average level of severity was increasing over the 
period; that is, only the sickest patients were attending the ED. Figure 7 shows that 
while the number of attendances per month decreased substantially, 
the proportion of patients within the aggregated triage categories actually 
remained stable. 
 
FIGURE 7 ED ATTENDANCES BY TRIAGE CATEGORY, FEBRUARY – MARCH 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across tables/figures may vary due to missing values for particular variables. 
 
Table 2 shows the proportion of admitted and not admitted attendances in the first 
and last two weeks of March 2020 with a triage category of ‘very urgent/ 
immediate’ by age group. This shows that older patients tend to present more 
acutely unwell with a higher proportion in the ‘very urgent/immediate’ triage 
category. 
 
There has been little change in the proportion of ‘very urgent/immediate’ 
attendances in the not admitted group for all age categories, with the exception of 
the 80 years and older group where the proportion decreased by almost 
5 percentage points. For those who were admitted there was an increase in the 
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TABLE 2 PROPORTION OF VERY URGENT/IMMEDIATE ATTENDANCES BY ADMISSION STATUS 
AND AGE GROUP, MARCH 2020 
 Not Admitted Admitted Total 
 Mar 1-15 Mar 16-31 Mar 1-15 Mar 16-31 Mar 1-15 Mar 16-31 
<10 years 15.4 14.6 43.6 42.6 19.9 18.6 
10-19 Years 14.6 15.0 37.9 41.5 18.2 20.5 
20-29 Years 14.1 14.7 35.3 37.2 17.2 18.6 
30-39 Years 15.0 14.9 34.6 37.1 18.6 19.2 
40-49 Years 14.6 15.3 37.3 39.9 19.8 20.8 
50-59 Years 16.2 16.6 44.8 41.0 24.6 24.2 
60-69 Years 16.4 17.0 47.5 46.0 28.5 28.9 
70-79 Years 16.5 16.9 45.1 47.6 30.8 33.4 
80+ Years 19.9 15.3 45.4 49.6 34.9 37.0 
Total 15.4 15.4 42.6 44.0 22.5 23.6 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across tables/figures may vary due to missing values for particular variables. 
 
3.6 Mode of arrival 
Figure 8 shows a seven-day moving average of the proportion of attendances to 
arrive at the ED via ambulance from 1 January 2020 to 31 March 2020. It shows 
that the proportion arriving by ambulance was around 24 per cent in the first few 
days of January but fell to around 20-21 per cent until 27 February. From 1 March 
the proportion has increased steadily to an average of just under 30 per cent. There 
were several days in the last two weeks of March where over one-third of 
attendances arrived via ambulance. Ambulance arrivals of this magnitude were last 
seen during Storm Emma at the beginning of March 2018 (see Appendix 
Figure A.3). 
 
FIGURE 8 PROPORTION OF ATTENDANCES ARRIVING VIA AMBULANCE, 01 JANUARY 2020 – 
31 MARCH 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Notes: Presented as a seven-day moving average. Three large hospitals currently have a large number of missing values for the 
admission source variable and have been excluded from the figure. This removes approximately 9 per cent of attendances 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The number of ED attendances has noticeably declined since the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. ED attendances almost halved during March. Attendances 
have decreased across all age groups and have fallen consistently across triage 
categories – even the most urgent ones. 
 
There are several possible reasons that might be contributing to the decline in 
attendance and admissions to EDs. First, some patients requiring urgent medical 
care may have been deterred from attending the ED for fear of acquiring COVID-19. 
Second, and related to this first explanation, some individuals may not have 
attended GPs to obtain a referral to the hospital, or some GPs may have become 
less likely to refer patients to hospital. Such behavioural explanations probably 
explain at least part of the reduction; one piece of evidence supporting this view is 
that ED attendances began to decline about one week before the first delay 
measures were introduced. Reductions observed are similar to those seen in the 
UK (NHS England, 2020). For a more in-depth exploration of this aspect of the 
reduction, data on numbers of patients and types of cases presenting at GP 
practices would be required, as well as the proportion referred onwards to 
hospital. These data were not available for analysis. 
 
A third possible reason for the decline is that the probability of injury or illness may 
have fallen as a result of reduced travel, sport, and social contact. Evidence from 
the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) in England has shown that less 
social contact has reduced GP attendances for respiratory infections by more than 
half between beginning and mid-March, and the reduction occurred prior to the 
UK ‘lockdown’ (Jefferson and Heneghan, 2020). Reduced frequency and duration 
of social interactions may also reduce the spread of respiratory and 
gastrointestinal diseases, and thereby some ED attendances, particularly amongst 
children. Lower sports participation may also be reducing injury rates, especially 
amongst children and young adults. Declines in driving could have reduced traffic 
accidents. Here too, disentangling the relative contributions of various demand-
side factors to the reductions in average admissions would require additional data 
(on the mix of ED hospital admissions associated with non-COVID infectious 
diseases, trauma etc.). Such data should eventually be available from the Hospital 
In-Patient Enquiry (HIPE) database.  
 
While some hospitalised COVID-19 patients are no doubt captured in these data, it 
is not possible to separate them out as no diagnosis information is available in the 
data. However, as of 31 March, just over 600 COVID-19 confirmed patients were 
hospitalised (HSE, 2020). This implies that even if each patient were admitted 
through ED, the broad conclusions presented here would not be affected. The 
absence of individuals with less severe COVID-19 symptoms, who might at other 
times have attended an ED with these symptoms but who are now self-isolating at 
home, is also unlikely to explain the large reduction in attendances in March. 
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COVID-19 affects all age groups, however the older population have much higher 
mortality rates. As a consequence of this, the 27 March guidelines advised 
cocooning for vulnerable populations and those aged 70 years and older. We do 
find slightly larger reductions in attendance rates for those aged 70 years and older 
compared to younger adults. However, across all age groups, children saw the 
largest percentage reductions in ED attendance rates. 
 
This analysis has examined the initial impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on ED 
attendance using data to the end of March 2020. However, it is possible that 
patterns of ED attendance may have continued to change in recent weeks as the 
COVID-19 crisis has intensified. We understand that there has been some recovery 
in ED attendances in April, with further recovery likely in May as restrictions are 
eased, but we do not have the data to show the scale of any reversal as yet. 
 
While there may be a number of reasons for reducing demand for ED care, peoples’ 
behaviour is likely to be the main factor. Further public information campaigns may 
be required to encourage and reassure people with symptoms to contact their GP 
or attend an ED where appropriate. Further work on the stabilisation and hopefully 
recovery in the number of ED attendances will be possible in future as newer data 
become available. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1 PUBLIC HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS BY HOSPITAL GROUP 
Children’s Hospital Group Dublin Midlands Hospitals Group 
CHI at Crumlin MRH Portlaoise 
CHI at Tallaght MRH Tullamore 
CHI at Temple St Naas General Hospital 
 St. James’s Hospital 
 Tallaght University Hospital 
Ireland East Hospitals Group South/South West Hospitals Group 
Mater Misericordiae University Hospital Cork University Hospital 
MRH Mullingar Mercy University Hospital 
Our Lady’s Hospital, Navan South Tipperary General Hospital 
St. Luke’s General Hospital, Kilkenny UH Kerry 
St. Michael’s Hospitala UH Waterford 
St. Vincent’s University Hospital  
Wexford General Hospital  
RCSI Hospitals Group Saolta Hospital Group 
Beaumont Hospital Galway University Hospitals 
Cavan General Hospital Letterkenny University Hospital 
Connolly Hospital Mayo University Hospital 
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital Portiuncula University Hospital 
 Sligo University Hospital 
University of Limerick Hospitals Group  
UH Limerick  
 
Notes: a Open 08:00 to 20:00 seven days per week. 
 
TABLE A.2 ANALYSIS INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS, Q1 2019/2020 
 2019 2020 
 Include Exclude Total Include Exclude Total 
 N N (%) N N N (%) N 
January 115,092 1,866 (1.6%) 116,958 105,201 1,543 (1.4%) 106,744 
February 104,366 1,468 (1.4%) 105,834 99,989 1,206 (1.2%) 101,195 
March 115,497 1,519 (1.3%) 117,016 77,932 1,205 (1.5%) 79,137 
April 112,937 1,572 (1.4%) 114,509    
May 116,898 1,565 (1.3%) 118,463    
June 106,754 1,198 (1.1%) 107,952    
July 113,020 1,677 (1.5%) 114,697    
August 109,715 1,293 (1.2%) 111,008    
September 111,654 1,449 (1.3%) 113,103    
October 113,006 1,464 (1.3%) 114,470    
November 111,161 1,282 (1.1%) 112,443    
December 116,057 1,213 (1.0%) 117,270    
Total 1,346,157 17,566 (1.3%) 1,363,723 283,122 3,954 (1.4%) 287,076 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
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FIGURE A.1 ED ATTENDANCES JANUARY 2017 – MARCH 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across figures/tables may vary due to missing values for particular variables. Two hospitals are excluded from the analysis 
in this figure to provide a consistent trend as they only began reporting to the PET in 2019. 
 
FIGURE A.2 ED ATTENDANCES BY REGION OF HOSPITALISATION, DAILY, Q1 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
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FIGURE A.3 PROPORTION OF ATTENDANCES ARRIVING VIA AMBULANCE, DAILY, FEBRUARY AND 
MARCH 2017 – 2020 
 
 
Source: HSE Patient Experience Time Database. 
Note: Totals across figures/tables may vary due to missing values for particular variables. Presented as a seven-day moving average. 
Three large hospitals currently have a large number of missing values for the admission source variable and have been excluded 
from the figure. Two hospitals are excluded from the analysis in this figure to provide a consistent trend as they only began 
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